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INTRODUCTION: SYNCHRONICITY AS A GOAL
The tools the United States uses to respond to the problem of
international terrorism and other threats to national security are a
common topic of discussion in international relations and security
studies circles. This essay addresses an aspect less often considered:
the process by which the government chooses from a number of
different tools, and how this process may be made more effective.
The goal is what I call synchronicity.
The United States enjoys a multi-faceted counterterrorism arsenal.
By design, there is not one favorite tool, applicable to all national
security challenges. While there are frequent discussions of a "grand
strategy" to deal with the threat of Islamic terrorism, there is a
general consensus that there is no single silver bullet.' It is perhaps
more appropriate to think of counterterrorism tools as a series of
shiny bullets whose glean need diligent maintenance by their owners,
lest they lose their viability. These "bullets," or tools, run the gamut,
from military action, diplomacy, law enforcement and economic
sanctions, to intelligence and covert action. A decision on which
bullet to fire at a particular counterterrorism problem should be an
ordered and reasoned one, rather than a game of Russian roulette.
Reasoned decision-making can only be assured by a steady and
constant engagement among government components. This is the
process of synchronicity.
We have not yet fully recognized this goal. We enjoy the ability to
mix and match different tools. This has not prevented us from falling
into a defining cultural tendency: to focus on the naive questions,
"What's hot?" and "What's not?" From there, we seize on the
former, ignoring the latter.
Consider the question of how to deal with the terrorists we are
lucky enough to capture alive. Since 9/11, the media, when faced
with this issue, has focused on the military commissions, the
designation of so-called enemy combatants, and the application of

1. See Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism, Strategies, and Grand Strategies, in
ATTACKING TERRORISM: ELEMENTS OF A GRAND STRATEGY 74, 75 (Audrey Kurth
Cronin & James M. Ludes eds., 2004) (defining "grand strategy" as "a more
inclusive conception that explains how a state's full range of resources can be
adapted to achieve national security").
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the rules of the Geneva Convention. In comparison, the media gives
relatively little attention to the role of domestic law enforcement.
This fascination with military options over domestic law
enforcement is not merely a fondness for the flavor of the day. We
have, after all, been involved in two ground wars since 9/11.
Moreover, efforts to apply criminal justice concepts to the terrorist
threat have been somewhat clumsy.2 Nonetheless, the academic
community has taken notice of the efficacy of the U.S. criminal
justice system-the application of the domestic law to the problem of
terrorists among us-as a powerful alternative to Pentagon-led
remedies.3
This essay starts with the premise that, given the multi-faceted
nature of the American counterterrorism arsenal, effective
counterterrorism should strive for synchronicity. It should be based
on the recognition that we have a series of counterterrorism tools and
that these tools cannot reach their full expression unless they are
aggressively and constantly pushed internally by their masters.
Government actors who are in charge of these tools should be tough
enough to wage (and enjoy) a constant battle with other government
components for the right to apply their skills to particular
counterterrorism challenges, mature enough to realize they will not
always win, wise enough to learn from their losses, and patient
enough to keep doing it. Unless the internal battle is constant,
synchronicity cannot be achieved.

2. See Michael Chertoff, Why Is This Ball in Our Court?, WALL ST. J., June
17, 2004, at A18 (suggesting that the U.S. legislative and executive branches
should balance the legal uncertainties between national security and civil
libertarian interests in the war against terrorism rather than force the criminal
justice system to develop a new legal framework). The President created the
Pentagon-led military tribunals on November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and
Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833
(Nov. 13, 2001), well before the emergence of the disclosure issues that, prior to
his guilty plea, complicated the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was first
indicted on December 11, 2001.
3. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws
and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 27-47 (2005)
(examining the U.S. Justice Department's multi-tiered strategy adopted in response
to an apparent change in focus from traditional criminal prosecution of terrorists to
prevention of attacks as the overriding priority).
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What are the rules of this intra-governmental competition? In this
constant battle, who decides the winner? That role falls on the
operational decision-makers, those charged with the responsibility
for making the final determination on how the United States should
respond to a particular terrorism situation. In counterterrorism, the
ultimate operational decision-maker, of course, is the President, who
is the Commander-in-Chief of our military and controls our federal
law enforcement, as well as diplomatic, intelligence and economic
sanction systems and players. The President and his advisors, if they
are fortunate enough to have multiple components pushing their
tools, hear the various proposals and declare a winner by making a
reasoned choice. It is incumbent on those who lose a particular battle
to pick themselves up and show up for work the next day, ready to
do it all over again. The operational decision-makers are ill-served
unless the various components battle among themselves, thereby
exposing the widest range of options. Synchronicity is lost when
there is an over-reliance on particular tools because a particular
government component is not being sufficiently aggressive. Lack of
4
synchronicity means missed opportunities in the long run.
This essay suggests some legal concepts that, without needing any
reform, could be harnessed to make the criminal justice system a
more effective option in the U.S. counterterrorism arsenal, adding
viable options for the American operational decision-makers to
consider in deciding how to respond to national security problems.
My thesis rests on the well-established notion that intelligence-raw
information-is the key to preventing bad things from happening. I
combine this with the concept that the United States, in a variety of
contexts, already criminalizes the act of thwarting the government's
right to information needed for its lawful functions. In fact, it is
already a crime to deprive the government, through deception, of
information to which it is entitled. After 9/11, the value of
information became a premium and for those who find this fact
unpalatable or inconvenient and who try to obstruct the collection of
this information, even that which is sought for regulatory purposes,
4. One might view unsynchronized counterterrorism policy as akin to a sloppy
golf swing. Sometimes it works and results in the straight drive down the fairway.
However, where it fails is in its consistency. Inevitably, golf balls hit with an
undisciplined swing veer into the woods or into the pond. As in counterterrorism,
the remedy is a synchronized motion, which takes practice.
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American criminal laws are a powerful hammer. This creates
attractive counterterrorism options that otherwise may not exist.
Part I of this essay describes a fascinating criminal case that
illustrates how the government's legitimate right to information-in
this particular case, how much income someone received and how it
was earned--can be used to incapacitate a terrorist against whom
more expedient military-style options were unavailable. The case
illustrates the concept of "pretextual prosecution": charging serious
criminals with relatively minor crimes because it is not possible to
prosecute them on the full extent of their conduct. Part II discusses
the recent literature on the concept of pretextual prosecution, which
supports the use of this strategy in the war on terror. Part III
identifies three areas where the government's right to information
can be used to identify and incapacitate people who are in the United
States and are threats to national security or possess information
relevant to the counterterrorism challenge. The conclusion brings the
law enforcement tools into the context of the synchronicity thesis.

I. THE STRANGE CASE OF EUGENE TAFOYA
A. THE FACTS
In 1980, there were some 10,000 Libyans living in the United
States. One, Faisal Zagallai, was a graduate student at Colorado State
University and an outspoken critic of the Qadhafi regime. One of
Muammar Qadhafi's intelligence officers, employed at the Libyan
Embassy in Washington, contacted another Qadhafi loyalist, who in
turn contacted a former Green Beret he knew. That person recruited a
jobless friend of his-Eugene A. Tafoya, another former Green
Beret-for the contract killing.' On October 14, 1980, a drunken
Tafoya, posing as an IBM recruiter, visited Zagallai's home and tried
to shoot him in his living room, leaving Zagallai blind in one eye.
Tafoya escaped through a window.

5. See Murray Waas, The Terpil Transcripts: Dinner with Idi and Other

Tales, THE NATION, Nov. 28, 1981, at 568 (reporting that Tafoya was just one
element of a multipart operation of Libyan recruited and trained hit men connected
to the murder and maiming of a dozen opponents of Qadhafi's regime exiled
throughout Europe and the United States).

AM. U. INT'L L. REv.

[21:157

A few months later, two boys playing in an irrigation ditch near
Zagallai's home found a pistol. The serial numbers were traced back
to a North Carolina pawn shop near Fort Bragg and a person who
sold the weapon to Tafoya. Using credit card and rental car receipts,
authorities tracked Tafoya down in New Mexico, where a search
uncovered a hit list that targeted American citizens. As it turned out,
Tafoya was linked to rogue CIA operatives Edwin Wilson and Frank
Terpil.6 Wilson was eventually convicted of various crimes in U.S.
7

courts.

The Colorado prosecution of Tafoya for the attempt on Zagallai's
life did not include the Qadhafi evidence and, although he was
convicted, on January 5, 1982 he received only a two-year sentence.8
At that point, two creative prosecutors from the U.S. Department
of Justice's Criminal Division stepped in, obtaining a tax indictment
against Tafoya.9 Their theory: Tafoya committed a crime by filing
1980 and 1981 federal income tax returns that omitted assassination
fees he had received from Edwin Wilson. The jury convicted him.
The Fifth Circuit, affirming Tafoya's conviction, rejected his

6. See id. (describing Terpil and Wilson's recruitment of Tafoya and
documenting that Wilson and Tafoya had a telephone conversation shortly before
the attempted murder of Zagallai); see also Agnus Deming, Kaddafi's U.S.
Connection, NEWSWEEK, July 20, 1981, at 44.
7. See United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding Wilson's
conviction for obstruction of justice and attempted murder of prosecutors and
witnesses in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York); United
States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming Wilson's conviction for
illegal shipment of plastic explosives in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas); United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1983)
(sustaining Wilson's conviction for illegal export of an M-16 rifle and four
revolvers in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia). Wilson's
conviction in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas was later
vacated because of a knowingly false affidavit used to support the government's
case at trial. United States v. Wilson, 289 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
8. See Ex-Green Beret Gets 2-Year Term, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1982, at A12;
see also People v. Tafoya, 703 P.2d 663 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (disagreeing with
Tafoya's assertion that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence and affirming his conviction).
9. The prosecutors were Karen Morrissette and Dan Fromstein. Ms.
Morrissette is currently with -the Fraud Section. Mr. Fromstein retired from the
Counterterrorism Section in February 2005.
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argument that the government was unfairly transforming the murder
case into a tax prosecution.10
B. A QUESTION OF FAIRNESS
Tafoya may be unsettling to aspiring criminals, to whom it may
appear that American law enforcement has an unfair advantage. It
was based on a simple notion: illegal eamings-"dirty money"-qualify as income. In addition, the American taxing authorities have
the right to inquire how someone earned their income.
Consider why somebody takes steps to conceal their incomegenerating activities. Saving taxes is merely one of many possible
motives. The hidden income may derive from some illegal activity,
like drug trafficking or extortion. If the person who makes a living
this way reports the proceeds and pays his proper taxes on it, he will
likely suffer from the interminable fear that the IRS, if it decides to
audit him, will discover the true source of the funds, and report him
to the DEA or the FBI.
Criminal tax cases are occasionally premised on more than
whether the defendants have failed to pay their taxes. In dirty money
cases, the tax charges can involve the failure to report the true source
of the income, in addition to the amount. When someone fails to
report dirty income, they can generally be prosecuted for tax fraud,
money laundering, and any crime that generated the dirty money.
When law enforcement needs to move quickly before all of the
evidence of the underlying misconduct is amassed, tax fraud may be
the only immediate option available.
Imagine Tafoya's chagrin at finding himself in federal court in San
Antonio, Texas, charged with tax crimes after he was able to
essentially beat the murder rap in Colorado. Was this a fair fight?
How could the federal jury in Texas give Tafoya a fair shake when
they learned that the income he was accused of not reporting was
compensation for his job as a paid assassin for the Libyan dictator?

10. United States v. Tafoya, 757 F.2d 1522, 1524 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that
the trial court "diligently and effectively" ensured that the evidence presented was
relevant to show source of income and motive, and the probative value of the
evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect).

164
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The federal judge in San Antonio clearly had his work cut out for
him. The prosecution was entitled to prove the income-nature of the
payments Tafoya failed to report on his return. Its theory was that the
payments were income because they were for services rendered-as
a hit man for Edwin Wilson and Muammar Qadhafi. This proof had
to be offered in a way that did not turn the jury against Tafoya based
on evidence whose prejudice exceeded its probative value.
Tafoya was ultimately convicted. At trial, Tafoya's defense was
that the payments he received for the violence was not income. His
appeal, however, focused on the claim that his defense to the tax
charges was prejudiced by the illegal activity. As the Fifth Circuit
later noted:
The key issue at trial was whether Tafoya was paid for his
work. [James Dean, an employee of Edwin Wilson], who
recruited Tafoya, admitted that Tafoya's initial assignment
was undertaken for expenses only-and the hope of more
remunerative future assignments. Tafoya testified that,
indeed, Wilson promised payment for future assignments.
Tafoya contended, however, that Wilson failed to fulfill his
promise. According to Tafoya, he "fronted" the expense of
costly international travel and received only partial
reimbursement. In short, Tafoya testified that he reported no
income from Wilson because Wilson cheated him out of
salary. Tafoya also characterized one payment by Wilson as a
loan or a gift.I'
The trial court refused to allow the prosecutors to put on evidence
"that Tafoya, in the course of his employment with Wilson, (1) shot a
Libyan residing in Colorado, (2) firebombed a home in Canada, and
(3) sought to obtain poison in London for the purpose of killing an
unknown person."' 12 Nonetheless, Tafoya admitted shooting the
victim, but denied receiving the payment salary promised by Wilson
for the shooting.' 3 The prosecutor then asked, "[a]fter that incident in
[Colorado], by the way, isn't it correct that [the Libyan] lost the sight
of one of his eyes as a result of that shooting?"' 4 This led to an oral
11. Id.

12. Id. at 1525.
13. Id. at 1526.
14. Id.
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admonishment by the judge. Later, the Fifth Circuit addressed the
prosecutor's cross-examination:
Evidence of the fact of Tafoya's assassination efforts was
relevant. Tafoya claimed to have received only expenses,
loans, or gifts. A jury reasonably could assess the credibility
of Tafoya's claim differently depending on the nature of
Tafoya's employment. It is unlikely that one would attempt
three killings in exchange largely for expenses--or continue
killings for over a year if not paid for the first one. Moreover,
the nature of Tafoya's employment was probative of his
motive to conceal the employment by failing to report illegal
income. Finally, and on the simplest level, the government
had to show the jury that Tafoya did something to earn the
income it alleged he failed to report. This is a frequent
problem in tax prosecutions, and prosecutors consistently
have been permitted to prove the source of unreported
income, a rule that here permitted evidence to establish the
job for which Tafoya was hired and paid.15
Note that the Fifth Circuit's cautionary language did not focus on
the propriety of using the criminal tax laws to redress terrorism that
may not have been adequately handled in state court. In fact, in
affirming Tafoya's conviction, the Fifth Circuit rejected his
argument that the government was unfairly transforming the murder
16
case into a tax prosecution.
15. Id. at 1526-27. The court did, however, have choice words for the
prosecutor's questions:
The district court made plain its intent to exclude the potentially prejudicial
details of Tafoya's assassination efforts. At several turns the prosecutor
bridled against this limitation but was effectively restrained by the district
court. The district court's attentiveness avoided the necessity of a reversal.
However, we caution prosecutors that tax cases are not to be transformed-by
evidence, argument, or implication-into trials for other crimes. Some
evidence of income source is necessary to prove a false return case and to
make it intelligible, but emphasis of the illegal source of income or dwelling
on lurid details is inappropriate. If it distracts a jury's focus, we will not
hesitate to reverse.
Id. at 1528.
16. See id. (concluding that the district court had not abused its discretion by
ruling that the probative value of the evidence concerning the assassination
outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice). In a post-script, in 1983, Tafoya
was found extraditable to Canada, where he was wanted for a Qadhafi-related
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II. PRETEXTUAL PROSECUTION
Tafoya was a modem version of what played out in a Chicago
courtroom during the Prohibition era. Al Capone, the most infamous
mobster of his time, was brought down not for bootlegging or
extortion or loan sharking or murder. Rather, he was convicted of
failing to report all of his income on his tax returns. 7 The Capone
case has been a vehicle for some recent academic analysis on
"pretextual prosecution": targeting people based on suspicion of one
crime but prosecuting them for another, lesser crime. Is this strategy
legal? Does it reflect sound public policy? Two recent law review
articles have looked into this question. Although the authors agree
that the practice is legal, they disagree on the second question. An
examination of their reasoning, however, lends support to the
argument that the United States should be aggressive in prosecuting
those who deprive the government of information pertinent to
terrorism.
A. HARRY LITMAN ON THE "AL CAPONE APPROACH"
Professor Harry Litman is a visiting associate professor at Rutgers
Law School in Camden, and a former United States Attorney in
Pittsburgh and Justice Department official in Washington. He takes
on the question of pretextual prosecution-which he describes as the
"Al Capone approach to federal prosecution law enforcement"-in
the August 2004 issue of the Georgetown Law Journal, ultimately
concluding that it is an appropriate exercise of federal prosecutorial
discretion, which should be encouraged.18
A former prosecutor, Litman does not reach this conclusion
blithely. He notes the criticism that has been leveled at the
Department of Justice's post-9/ 11 strategy of pursuing immigration
cases against hundreds of noncitizens from Arab countries based on
the possibility, "however remote," that the detainees have some
firebombing. In re Extradition of Tafoya, 572 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Tex. 1983). After
his U.S. conviction, he also litigated the question of whether his U.S. military
pension should be applied to reimburse the government for the costs of his courtappointed attorney. United States v. Tafoya, 803 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1986).
17. Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1932).
18. Harry Litman, PretextualProsecution,92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1135 (2004).
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connection to the war on terrorism. He then proceeds to take on some
of the best arguments against pretextual prosecution. They include:
Decisions to prosecute may not account for the personal
qualities and characteristics of a criminal defendant beyond the
charged offense because, in pretextual prosecutions, conduct
unsubstantiated in a court of law provides a basis for actual or
potentially enhancing punishment of a criminal defendant, where law
enforcement and prosecutorial decisions lack standard procedural
safeguards, or the "crucible of adversary proceedings."' ' 9
Pretextual prosecution can increase the risk of a criminal case
being brought against a defendant based on ulterior motives, such as
personal animosity, racial prejudice or political opposition.2" The
ulterior motives of the prosecutor make the decision personal, where
the prosecutorial decision-making process may include the criminal
defendant's political beliefs or unpopularity with the governing class,
as well as a criminal defendant "being personally obnoxious to the
21
prosecutor himself.
• To the extent that prosecutions rely on a law that "has fallen
into desuetude" or that never has been enforced, pretextual
prosecution raises the specter of singling out conduct that should not
be criminalized, and of citizens not having adequate notice that their
conduct could result in criminal charges.22
• If the government searches hard enough, it can find anyone to
have violated some obscure statute.23 It seems unjust for such a large
portion of the government's resources to target one person.24

19. Id. at 1153 (noting that this practice may seem to be in conflict with the
U.S. criminal justice system's commitment to the due process requirement that
criminal defendants be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a neutral forum
with set rules).
20. Id. at 1149.
21. Id. at 1155-56.
22. Id. at 1170 (using the detention of Zacarias Moussaoui on a technical
immigration charge as an example).
23. Id. at 1151 (noting that there are many laws on the books that are no longer
enforced but nonetheless are actionable).
24. Id. at 1155.
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• Such a long arm of the prosecution's power allows for the
25
potential of totalitarianism.
In the end, Professor Litman finds these arguments unavailing,
based partly on how our criminal justice system is structured and the
existence of sufficient safeguards to protect against these fears.26 We
rely on a system that involves prosecutorial discretion. Most agree
that prosecutors should choose how to apply their resources against
the pool of violators in some other way than randomness. In this
sense, your "dangerousness" (perhaps as shown by your prior
criminal record) should be a legitimate factor in determining whether
you should be chosen for prosecution. If you are being prosecuted on
the basis of race or your political beliefs, you may seek to have the
indictment dismissed by advancing a claim of selective prosecution.
It is, after all, unconstitutional for the government to treat similarlysituated people differently on the basis of some impermissible
classification, like race.
If you can demonstrate a prima facie case of selective
prosecution-irrespective of your guilt or innocence-you can force
the prosecution to explain its prosecutorial decision. If it is based on
an improper motive, the indictment will be dismissed. As far as fair
notice is concerned, the criminal laws themselves serve that function,
and one cannot comfortably rely on the fact that a law has not been
prosecuted in choosing to violate it. The fear of totalitarianism
requires many more degenerative steps in our legal system to become
manifest, and this concern ignores the fact that prosecutors are held
to a standard of proving what they allege.
What the critic of pretextual prosecutions needs to win the
argument, according to Litman, is a series of events that are not
realistic to anyone other than those who are inclined to believe the
27
worst about our nation's law enforcers.
In effect, the critic is worrying about the possibility of a twotiered pretext, in which the prosecutor proceeds from the
"bad" pretext-for example, racial animus-through the
25. Id. at 1151.
26. Id. at 1182 (arguing that law enforcement can do a lot of wrong using their
discretion, but the Al Capone approach is generally justified and sensible).
27. Id. at 1179.
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"good" pretext-for example, dangerousness to the
community-to the actual federal charge (of which, by
hypothesis, the putative defendant is in fact guilty). But it is
hard to see in practice what the middle step offers the
hypothetical malevolent prosecutor. In order for the
possibility to present a genuine practical concern, we first
have to posit a set of cases in which a) the defendant is guilty
of the federal offense; b) his offense is not sufficiently serious
to justify federal prosecution in its own right; c) there is,
however, a colorable claim for application of the Al Capone
approach; and while d) that claim would not normally justify
prosecution under the approach fairly applied, e) it is strong
enough for the malevolent prosecutor to exploit as an
additional pretext to give cover to her racial animus or other
inappropriate motivation. If the case is strong enough on its
own merits, the Al Capone approach does no work; if it is
less than nearly strong enough, the Al Capone approach will
not help. The problem is not only that there is no reason to
believe that such cases actually arise with any frequency.28
Litman succeeds in showing that pretextual prosecution is neither
illegal nor unconstitutional, and he goes a long way towards
establishing it as a laudable strategy.
B. RICHMAN, STUNTZ AND "MUDDIED SIGNALS"

More recently, two other commentators addressed pretextual
prosecution, reaching a different conclusion than Litman. In the
March 2005 edition of the Columbia Law Review, Professors Daniel
Richman and William Stuntz acknowledge that the strategy cannot
be adequately attacked based on concerns about the fairness to the
individual defendants. 29 They accept, for example, that "[p]retextual
prosecutions are a widely accepted feature of our criminal justice
28. Id. Moreover, the judiciary is an effective bulwark against this type of
abuse. American judges have not been reluctant to interpose their judgment when
U.S. security efforts go too far. Jeff Breinholt, How About a Little Perspective: The
USA PATRIOTAct and the Uses and Abuses of History, 9 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 17,

20 (2004).
29. Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay
on the PoliticalEconomy of PretextualProsecution, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 583, 639

(2005) (arguing that the most troubling aspect of pretextual prosecution is not the
lack of fairness to defendants, but rather the challenge it poses to the federal
government to monitor its own efforts of combating crime).
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system, and they are widely, albeit not universally, understood to be
both legally and ethically permissible."3 They instead try to argue
that the practice is bad for society, since the public is somehow
entitled to non-pretextual prosecutions, lest they be dazed and
confused and unable to keep score properly.3 This is a rather bizarre
argument.
According to Richman and Stuntz, it is bad for society when
prosecutors succeed in charging and convicting someone for
something less than what motivated the law enforcement attention in
the first place because this results in "muddied signals. 32 But who,
exactly, is confused? The confusion lies in the public, according to
the authors, because the public is deprived of the knowledge of bad
characters in its midst.3 3 So are would-be criminals, who are led to
believe that if they take care not to violate small laws, they can
escape punishment for their larger offenses. Richman and Stuntz
maintain that Capone sends a message that is too complicated to be
helpful, and that is: "If you run a criminal enterprise, you should
keep your name out of the newspapers and at least pretend to pay
your taxes. 34
Richman and Stunz base their argument on the claim that the
similarity of the charges that drive the prosecution and the charges
that are recorded on the defendant's rap sheet determine the political
economy of criminal law enforcement. 35 The effectiveness of the law
enforcement depends on the crimes and charges coinciding.3 6 In
other words, it is unfair for prosecutors to charge serious criminals
with non-serious crimes, since it deprives the public of the right to

30. Id. at 585.
31. Id. at 586-87 (asserting that when crimes and charges do not match up, the
public loses trust in the justice system).
32. Id. at 586 (noting that while the public may have understood the reasons
underlying Capone's tax fraud prosecution because of his notoriety, such publicity
and fame is not the norm in pretextual prosecutions).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (asserting that where a conviction is for an unrelated, lesser crime than
the one prompting the investigation, voters receive muddied signals from the
government).
36. Id.
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know both the identities of the real bad people, and information on
the good prosecutors.
Richman and Stuntz argue that the Justice Department's reliance
on the Al Capone strategy after 9/11-which they accept as a
necessity-left it in a "quandary."37 Justice officials, they claim,
would have liked to tally the number of terrorists their prosecutors
were able to put away. Instead, by going after immigration violators
and those who provide material support to terrorists, federal law
enforcement "lack[ed] any external validation of its claimed
success,"38 leaving the Bush Administration hard pressed to
demonstrate to Congress and the public that it has effectively used
the massive resources that have been committed to
counterterrorism.3 9
What is Richman and Stuntz's solution to the "problem" of
pretextual prosecution? It seems their goal is greater politicization of
the criminal justice system, making federal prosecutors more
accountable to the public, like their colleagues at the state level who
are accountable to the voters:
The key is political accountability. The federal law
enforcement system will never have the accountability of its
local counterparts. Federal officials are appointed, not
elected. The issues on which their political masters rise and
fall are usually not related to crime. And it is hard (though, as
we have seen, not impossible) for federal crimes to carry the
same immediacy as a body in the street or a battered victim.
Even so, federal officials can be held to a far greater degree
of responsibility than they have faced for the past three
quarters of a century. Whatever its faults, one large and
important virtue of the War on Terror is that it makes that
goal more achievable. Other political forces are working in

37. Id. at 587.
38. Id.
39. Richman and Stunz fail to explain how their fellow academics have been
able to keep up with all the good news, nor point to any official Justice Department
statements indicating that it found its post-9/l1 efforts less than satisfying. See
Chesney, supra note 3.
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the same direction. The result may be, over time, fewer Al
Capones-and better federal law enforcement.40
Of course, the result could be more Al Capones and Eugene
Tafoyas running around free, happily unencumbered by police
scrutiny.

1II. PRETEXTUAL PROSECUTION IN
COUNTERTERRORISM
As aggravating as some of Richman and Stuntz's arguments are,
their article is filled with a number of keen observations relevant to
the national security challenge we face today. They accurately
recognize that the only real constitutional limitations on substantive
criminal law involve claims of privacy and First Amendment activity
that would be chilled by particular statutes, and that courts generally
do not delve into questions of whether particular illegal conduct is
overcriminalized.4 1 They credit the value of "strategically defmed
crimes," like possession of burglary weapons, which seek to get at
precursor conduct.42 They acknowledge the value of the Al Capone
approach in New York City, where stepped-up enforcement of minor
crimes like turnstile jumping led police to offenders with outstanding
warrants on major crimes, and resulted in a sharp decline in subway
crime.43 Perhaps most significantly, even if they do not like
pretextual prosecution in general, they are willing to accept it after
9/11. Here, their comments were remarkably cogent:
Confronted with the greatest security challenge it has faced in
recent years, the federal law enforcement bureaucracy has
turned to the strategy it used to bring down Capone and
dozens of other mob figures. And, indeed, that strategy is
particularly well-suited to the War on Terror. Among the
40. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 29, at 639.
41. Id. at 597 (adding that there are no real limitations on the types of sentences
a legislature may attach to "modest" crimes).
42. Id. at 609 (acknowledging that such crimes open the door to pretextual
charging).
43. Id. (calling such tactics "Capone in reverse" because the person is caught
for the minor infraction, but ultimately can be prosecuted for the charge on the
outstanding warrant).
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hallmarks of the 9/11 plot and Al Qaeda operations generally
are low-profile cells of individuals who do not conspicuously
violate the law until they are ready to inflict catastrophic
damage or assist those who do. To be sure, it is sometimes
possible to grab terrorists at a point in their planning such that
the government can clearly prove their intentions and still
neutralize the threat, as occurred when Sheik Abdel Rahman
and others who were prosecuted for plotting to blow up a
number of New York City landmarks in 1993. Yet in that
case, an FBI informant had infiltrated the group-a piece of
investigative success that can rarely be replicated.'
With these infiltration difficulties in mind, the authors continued:
If they can be criminally prosecuted before they strike, the
provable offenses of those seeking to commit terrorist acts
will thus be relatively minor. Bringing such cases can disrupt
terrorist plans and provide leverage for the government to
obtain cooperation from defendants; it can also incapacitate
targets without resort to material witness warrants,
immigration detentions, and other noncriminal processes that
(according to some) are amenable to even greater misuse.
Moreover, the government can satisfy its discovery
obligations without revealing valuable intelligence (so long
as it's45not exculpatory) when it brings these stripped-down
cases.

It seems that pretextual prosecution in an effort to keep innocent
Americans safe from terrorist violence is defensible, even among the
most vigorous critics of the Al Capone strategy.
The Tafoya case reflects a modern example of this approach.
Eugene Tafoya could not be charged with a violent crime, since he
had already been prosecuted by the state of Colorado for trying to
kill Faisal Zagallai. Instead, federal prosecutors got him on a tax
reporting violation-the crime of failing to tell the IRS how he
earned a living (as a paid assassin for a Libyan dictator), and how
much he earned for his services. What brought Tafoya down was, in
essence, false statements to the IRS designed to conceal his terrorist
associates.
44. Id. at 622
45. Id. at 623.
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After 9/11, most people accept the idea that the United States
government has a right to know who among us is associated with
terrorist organizations. While it is certainly not a crime to associate
with such groups, or even to advocate on their behalf, it is a crime to
affirmatively help them. 6 People who are associated with terrorist
groups are more likely to help them, and to have information on what
they are up to. Moreover, there are a number of well-established
American regulatory regimes in which the government is entitled to
inquire into one's associations, and in which it is a crime to lie about
them. Is it an abuse of the criminal justice system to punish people
who lie about their terrorist associations, and to use the threat of
criminal prosecution to compel them to provide this information?47
Arguably not, if we agree that effective counterterrorism depends on
information.
What regulatory systems are already in place to seek information
on terrorist associations, and how can they be harnessed to make
domestic law enforcement more robust in the counterterrorism arena
while maximizing the information on terrorist planning and
operation? I suggest three areas for immediate attention: the systems
that grant U.S. citizenship, those that oversee tax-exempt status, and
those that regulate U.S. persons acting as foreign agents.

46. This is an important distinction that underlies the constitutionality of the
Department of Justice's most effective counterterrorism weapon-the crime of
"providing material support ... to designated foreign terrorist organizations." 18
U.S.C. § 2339B (2000); see also Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d
1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The statute does not prohibit being a member of one
of the designated groups or vigorously promoting and supporting the political
goals of the group. Plaintiffs are even free to praise the groups for using terrorism
as a means of achieving their ends. What [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996] prohibits is the act of giving material support, and there is no
constitutional right to facilitate terrorism by giving terrorists the weapons and
explosives with which to carry out their grisly missions. Nor, of course, is there a
right to provide resources with which terrorists can buy weapons and explosives.").
47. It is important to bear in mind that I am not suggesting that people be
targeted for criminal investigation because of their associations with certain
controversial groups. Indeed, current FBI guidelines (with which I do not disagree)
prohibit inquiries solely on the basis of protected First Amendment activity. What I
am saying is that, where certain associations are relevant to who among us might
have information about the intentions of our enemies, such people should not be
able to deny their associations under oath with impunity.
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A. SEEKING U.S. CITIZENSHIP
It is a crime to knowingly procure naturalization contrary to law.48
It is a separate crime to "knowingly make[] any false statement under
oath, in any case, proceeding, or matter relating to... naturalization.
"49

Persons applying for naturalization are required to fill out and
sign, under penalties of perjury, a document known as a Form N-400.
Part 10 of that form requires applicants to list any past and present
membership in, or association with, every "organization, association,
fund, foundation, party, club, society, or similar group in the United
States or in any other place."50
Since 9/11, the Department of Justice has successfully charged
people with failing to report their affiliation with certain terrorist
organizations on their Form N-400, 51 and with lying to federal law
enforcement about their association with certain accused terrorists.52
Do these prosecutions represent an unconstitutional punishment of
one's First Amendment rights to association?
In the 1950s, courts rejected this argument by labor leaders
charged with falsely denying their Communist ties. For example, on
September 17, 1945, union leader Harry Bridges, an immigrant
seaman from Austria, appeared in the Superior Court in San
Francisco for a naturalization hearing and denied that he was then, or
had ever been, a member of the Communist Party in the United
States. Three years later, he was indicted for naturalization fraud and
ultimately convicted.53 Similarly, to avail his union of the processes
of the National Labor Relations Board, in December 1955, John

48. 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).
49. Id. § 1015(a).
50. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Form
No. N-400, Application for Naturalization, pt. 10(b) (2005), available at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/formsfee/forms/files/n-400ins.pdf. In United States v.
Damrah, an opinion discussed infra, membership and affiliation questions in the
old N-400 form were located in Part 9. 412 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 2005).
51. See Damrah,412F.3d at 621.
52. See United States v. Biheiri, 341 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596-97 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(finding that prosecution was not vindictive).
53. Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 211-12, 214 (1953).
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Joseph Killian filed an affidavit that said, inter alia, "I am not a
member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such Party." In
November 1955, Killian was indicted in Chicago under 18 U.S.C. §
1001, based on the theory that he falsely denied membership and
affiliation with the Communist Party in his affidavit. Killian was
convicted. 4 Both Bridges and Killian argued that their prosecutions
were defective and that they were being punished for their
associations, and each of their cases reached the Supreme Court
(albeit on different issues).5
Killian's challenge was to the jury instructions on the meaning of
"membership" and "affiliation. ' 56 In addressing this question, Justice
Whitaker's opinion for the Court involved an analysis of the nature
of the crime Killian was charged with violating and the following
observations that support the premise of this essay:
[Killian] was not charged with criminality for being a
member of or affiliated with the Communist Party, nor for
participation in any criminal activities of or for the
Communist Party. He was not charged with advocating or
teaching the overthrow of the Government . . . or with
knowing membership in an organization advocating the
overthrow of the Government by force and violence ....The
charge was that, to enable a labor union of which he was an
officer to comply with § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations
Act and thus be permitted to use the processes of the Labor
Board, petitioner, on December 11, 1952, knowingly made
and caused to be transmitted to the Labor Board a false
affidavit, saying he was not then a member of or affiliated
with the Communist Party when in fact he was both a
member of and affiliated with the Communist Party, and that
those acts were made criminal
and punishable by 18 U.S.C. §
57
1001, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001.
The Supreme Court upheld Killian's conviction. 5 8 Bridges'
conviction, however, was reversed because of the statute of
54. Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 234-35 (1961).
55. Id. at 235, 241-42; Bridges, 346 U.S. at 214.
56. Killian, 368 U.S. at 245.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 258.
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limitations, although the Ninth Circuit did find his false statements
legally actionable:
There was, at the time in suit, no statutory bar to any alien's
naturalization on account of membership in the Communist
Party, and possessing such membership was not a crime.
There was, however, a bar against naturalization of one who
adhered to the belief that this government should be changed
by force or violence, and such adherence was a legal ground
for deportation. False denials of such membership at a
naturalization proceedings [sic] were material. The Russian
brand of Communism and works of Karl Marx and Lenin
were well known and their teachings of the doctrine of
overturning our government by force and violence was
common knowledge. Had Bridges answered the court's
question in the affirmative, the next line of questions which
logically would have followed would have been as to whether
Bridges believed in the violent overthrow of the government.
From the answers received, the court would determine
whether the applicant was devoted to the United States
Constitution, and whether as a matter of fact and law Bridges
qualified as a person entitled to citizenship. 9
Clearly, the United States has an interest in limiting citizenship to
those people who are committed to be good Americans. If citizenship
is to mean anything, a government must be able to discriminate
between nationals and non-nationals when conferring the benefits of
American citizenship. By the same token, where naturalization is a
benefit to be conferred only on the eligible-a concept with which
few would disagree-we have an obligation to assure that eligibility
standards are met. The requirement that applicants affirm, under
penalties of perjury on their citizenship application, that they have
listed all of the organizations of which they are members or affiliates,
is hardly novel. Punishing people for lying in this context is an
important component of maintaining the integrity of this process.
A good illustration of how this concept can be applied in the
counterterrorism context comes from a recent case successfully
prosecuted in Akron, Ohio.6" In 1984, Fawaz Damrah entered the
59. Bridges v. United States, 199 F.2d 811, 829 (9th Cir. 1952), rev'd on other
grounds, 346 U.S. 209 (1953).
60. United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2005).
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United States on a visa, and within two years became the Imam
(religious leader) of the Al-Farooq Mosque in New York. 61 During
that time, Damrah approached the Board of Directors of the Mosque
for approval to open a New York office of Afghan Refugee Services,
Inc. ("ARS") within the Mosque. ARS was created during the late
1980s to support Afghan fighters who were attempting to expel
Russians from Afghanistan. As a director of ARS, Damrah, along
with the organization's leader, traveled around the United States
attempting to raise money. Damrah's involvement with ARS ended
in 1990, when he left Al-Farooq Mosque due to a dispute over the
use of contributions to ARS after the 1989 expulsion of the Soviets
from Afghanistan.
During this period, Damrah was also involved with the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad ("PIJ"), a group which objects to the existence of the
State of Israel and is committed to its destruction. Since 1989, the
U.S. Department of State has included the PIJ in its list of major
terrorist groups based on PIJ's involvement in various terror attacks.
Damrah's association with the PIJ extended as well to the Islamic
Committee for Palestine ("ICP"), which was used to raise funds for
the PIJ in the United States. Did Damrah know the true nature of PIJ
and ICP, and their support for violence? At a videotaped ICP
fundraising event, Damrah stated, "A brief note about the Islamic
Committee for Palestine: It is the active arm of the Islamic Jihad
Movement in Palestine. We preferred to call it the 'Islamic
Committee for Palestine' for security reasons."62
After Damrah's 1990 break with Al-Farooq Mosque, he moved to
Cleveland, Ohio. There, he became the Imam of the Islamic Center
of Cleveland. He thereafter went through the naturalization process
and became a U.S. citizen.
On his application, an INS63 Form N-400, which he submitted on
October 18, 1993, Question 3, Part 7 asked: "Have you at any time,
anywhere, ever ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in
61. Id. at 620-21 (recounting the relevant background facts of the case).
62. Id. at621.
63. The INS's services and benefits functions transitioned into the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Service within the Department of Homeland Security

in 2003. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., About
http://uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/index.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2005).

Us,
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the persecution of any person because of race, religion, national
origin, or political opinion?"' Damrah answered in the negative.65
Part 9 of Form N-400,6 6 captioned "Memberships and
Organizations," instructed him to:
List your present and past memberships in or affiliation with
every organization, association, fund, foundation, party, club,
society, or similar group in the United States or in any other
place. Include any military service in this part. If none, write
"none." Include the name of the organization, locations, dates
of membership and the nature of the organization.67
In response to this question, Damrah listed the "Islamic Council of
Ohio" and the "Islamic Center of Cleveland," but he omitted ARS,
the PIJ, and the ICP. 6s He signed Part 11 of Form N-400, which
required that the applicant "swear or affirm, under penalty of perjury
under the laws of the United States of America, that this application,
and the evidence submitted with it, is all true and correct. 6 9
INS examiner Kim Adams subsequently interviewed Damrah on
December 17, 1993, in order to determine whether he was qualified
for naturalization. Adams reviewed the answers Damrah supplied on
his Form N-400 and took note of those changes Damrah wished to
make. In her testimony, Adams stated that a "yes" response to the
question regarding persecution "could render [the applicant]
ineligible for naturalization. ' 70 If an untruthful answer to the
persecution question was discovered, the INS could deny the
application. The INS could also deny the application if information
was provided about organizations potentially involved in
persecution. Adams also testified that if membership or affiliation
with a suspect organization was provided, she would attempt to

64. Damrah, 412 F.3d at 621.
65. Id.
66. See supra note 50 (explaining that membership and affiliation questions on
Form N-400 were previously located under Part 9).
67. Damrah, 412 F.3d at 621.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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obtain further information, request documentation, or "forward the
application over to the investigative section for further inquiry. '"71

Upon completion of his interview with Adams, Damrah signed the
Form N-400 under penalty of perjury.
Damrah was naturalized on April 29, 1994. The omissions from
Damrah's naturalization application were discovered in 1995 when
videotapes of the ICP fundraiser were seized in a law enforcement
raid in Florida.
Damrah was indicted on December 16, 2003, and charged with
unlawful procurement of naturalization. The indictment alleged that
Damrah:
(1) knowingly procured naturalization contrary to law and to
which he was not entitled by failing to disclose membership
in or affiliation with ARS, the PIJ, and the ICP; (2) falsely
stated that he had never ordered, incited, assisted, or
otherwise participated in the persecution of any person
because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion;
and (3) failed to disclose that he had been arrested and
charged with assault in January of 1989 in New York City.72
He was convicted by the jury, following a week-long trial.73
Damrah's appeal, which argued that the charges were duplicitous and
that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, was
unsuccessful.

74

B. TAX-EXEMPT CHARITIES
The 9/11 Commission issued a special report which claimed that,
contrary to widespread belief, al Qaeda received much of its funding
not from Osama Bin Laden's personal inheritance, but rather from

71. Id.

72. Id.
73. Id. The court refused to suppress evidence obtained by the government
through surveillance sanctioned under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Id.
74. Id. at 628-29 (holding further that Damrah failed to prove reversible error
pertaining to the proffered jury instructions).
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charities in the Persian Gulf region.75 Given that the United States is
the richest and arguably most generous country on earth, is it logical
to operate on the belief that there are charities here that are
associated with some of the world's terrorist organizations? If not,
one need only consider the number of U.S.-based charities that have
been implicated in terrorism-related illegal financial transactions
since 9/11.76

Unlike Canada and the United Kingdom, the United States does
not have a federal charities commission. Instead, American charities
are sometimes regulated by the individual states' consumer
protection laws.77 The closest thing the United States has to a federal
regulator of charities is the IRS, which detennines whether nonprofit entities operate in such a way that they can legally offer their
donors the benefits of tax deductions for charitable contributions.78
To perform this function, the IRS requires the newly-formed charity
to apply to the IRS for tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C. §
501(c)(3), submitting what is known as an IRS Form 1023.
Thereafter, the organization must file an annual information tax
return-Form 990-which is signed under penalties of perjury.
75. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
STAFF REPORT TO THE NAT'L COMM'N, MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 4
(2004), available at http://www.9-1 lcommission.gov/staffstatements/91 1_Terr
FinMonograph.pdf (noting that al Qaeda fundraising efforts generated
approximately $30 million per year through Islamic charities and facilitators who
gathered money from donors).
76. See Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 750 (7th Cir.
2002); United States v. Dhafir, 104 F. App'x 782 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1351 (M.D. Fla. 2004); United States v. Arnaout,
282 F. Supp. 2d 838, 846 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev.
v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 69-71 (D.D.C. 2002); United States v.
Benevolence Int'l Found., 222 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1008-09 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
77. See Dana Brakman Reiser & Evelyn Brody, Who Guards the Guardians?:
Monitoringand Enforcement of Charity Governance: Introduction, 80 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 543, 545 (2005) (noting that the source of state laws regulating much of
charities' internal affairs include trust law, non-profit corporate law, and for-profit
corporate law). Because these state laws derive from various sources, there is no
distinct and comprehensive set of regulations. Id.
78. See Internal Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treas., Exemption Requirements,
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=96099,00.html
(last visited
Dec. 2, 2005) (noting that the IRS requires that an organization must either be a
corporation, community chest, fund, foundation, or charitable trust in order to be
organized exclusively for charitable purposes).
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The IRS grants exemption from federal income tax to
"[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary or educational purposes,
or to foster national or international amateur sports competition....
or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals .... ,,7Such
entities, referred to as "501(c)(3) organizations," enjoy two primary
benefits: (1) their income is not subject to taxation, and (2) donations
to them are deductible as charitable contributions on donors' federal
income tax returns.
Foreign 501(c)(3)'s-that is, exempt organizations that are
incorporated outside the United States--do not enjoy the second
benefit; donations made to them are not deductible by the donor.
Similarly, domestic 501(c)(3) organizations sending money overseas
must demonstrate that they are not acting as mere conduits for
foreign organizations, lest the deductibility of their donations may be
disallowed. A domestic 501(c)(3) will not be considered a conduit to
a foreign entity if it maintains discretion and control over the
disbursements abroad.
To be recognized as a 501(c)(3) organization, most entities must
file an IRS Form 1023 (Application for Recognition of Exemption),
which is signed under penalties of perjury by an authorized agent of
the entity.80 The information required by the form includes an
employer identification number ("EIN"), a confirmed copy of the
organization's Article of Incorporation, a copy of any by-laws
adopted by the organization, a full description of the organization's
purposes and activities, and financial statements showing the
organization's receipts (and their sources) and expenditures (and
their nature) for the current year and for the preceding three years,
including a balance sheet for the most recent period.8" Historically,
the Form 1023 included several specific questions:

79. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
80. Internal Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treas., Form No. 1023, Application
for Recognition of Exemption (2004) [hereinafter Form 1023], available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fl023.pdf.
81. Id.
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• "What
are or will be the organization's sources of financial
82
support?"
• "Describe the organization's fundraising program, both actual
and planned, and explain to what extent it has been put into effect...
*Attach representative copies of solicitations for financial support. 83
- "Does the organization control or is it controlled by any other
84
organization?
* "Is the organization financially accountable to any other
organization?"85
- "Describe the organization's present and proposed efforts to
attract members, and attach a copy of any descriptive literature or
promotional material used for this purpose."86
Recently, the Form 1023 was amended.87 The new form asks for
more specific information on the applicant's foreign activities.88
These amendments were the result of an increased IRS focus on
terrorist financing.89

82. Internal Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treas., Form No. 1023, Application
for Recognition of Exemption, pt. II, 1. 2 (1997) (on file with author).
83. Id. pt. II, 1. 3.
84. Id. pt. II, 1. 5.
85. Id. pt. II, 1. 7.
86. Id. pt. II, 1. 11 (b).
87. See Form 1023, supra note 80; see also Exempt Organizations:
Enforcement Problems, Accomplishments, and Future Direction: Hearing on
Charities and Charitable Giving: Proposals for Reform Before the Sen. Fin.
Comm., 109th Cong. 8 (2005) (statement of Mark W. Everson, Comm'r of Internal
Revenue Serv.) [hereinafter Hearing], available at http://www.finance.
senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2005test/metestO4O505.pdf (noting that the recent
revision to Form 1023 aims to reduce the number of organizations that abuse their
tax-exempt status by asking questions which help identify organizations that have
close ties to service organizations owned by insiders).
88. Form 1023, supra note 80, pt. VIII.
89. See Hearing, supra note 87, at 12-13 ("We want to assure that U.S.
charities have no role in financing terrorist activity, and we continue to assist in the
fight against terrorism and those who fund it. On the criminal side, we have
ongoing investigations concerning potential terrorist financing ....We are seeking
better information about U.S. charities with international activities.").
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Once an entity gains 501(c)(3) status, it is required to file an
annual tax return, known as an IRS Form 990.90 The IRS Form 990 is
available for inspection, and some members of the public rely on
Form 990 as the primary or sole source of information about a
particular organization. According to IRS instructions, "how the
public perceives an organization in such cases may be determined by
the information presented on its return," and accuracy is vitally
important. 91 Form 990 must be signed under penalties of perjury. The
Form 990 instructions describe regulations that require 501(c)(3)recognized entities to make their filed Form 990 available to the
public for inspection. 92
Among the items on Form 990 that may be relevant to terroristrelated associations:
* Requiring charities to disclose information regarding their
direct or indirect relationships with other charities. According to the
IRS instruction booklet, this provision helps prevent diversion or
expenditure of a charity's funds for non-charitable purposes. 93
* Requiring charities to report their website address, or report
"n/a" if they do not have one.94
0 Requiring the charity to report certain types of organizations
"affiliated" with (closely related to) the filing charity, and that the
filing charity is required to attach a schedule listing the name and
address of each affiliate receiving payments. 95
* Requiring a yes/no answer to the question, "Did the
organization engage in any activity not previously reported to the
IRS? If 'Yes,' attach a detailed description of each activity. 96
90. Internal Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treas., Form No. 990, Return of
Organization Exempt from Income Tax [hereinafter Form 990], available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf.
91. Internal Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treas., Instructions for Form 990 and
Form 990-EZ, at 1-2 (2004) [hereinafter Form 990 Instructions], available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990-ez.pdf.
92. Id. at 10; see 26 C.F.R 301.6104(d)-i (2005).
93. Form 990 Instructions, supra note 91, at 11.
94. Form 990, supra note 90, Item G.
95. Id. 1. 16.
96. Id. 1. 76.
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• Requiring a yes/no answer to the question, "Did the
organization solicit any contribution or gifts that were not tax
97
deductible?"
If Form 1023 or Form 990 contain false information, the persons
responsible for them can be charged with tax perjury or found guilty
of a felony. 98 Moreover, because these forms are intentionally made
public so that people can make educated decisions about which
charities should received their donations, false items are arguably a
fraud on the public. 99
C. FOREIGN AGENTS
0 was enacted to:
The Foreign Agent Registration Act ("FARA")"'

[P]rotect the national defense, internal security, and foreign
relations of the United States by requiring public disclosure
by persons engaging in propaganda activities and other
activities for or on behalf of foreign governments, foreign
political parties, and other foreign principals so that the
Government and the people of the United States may be
informed of the identity of such persons and may be informed
of the identity of such persons and may appraise their
statements and actions in the light of their associations and
activities.101
FARA requires every agent of a foreign principal to file a
registration statement with the Attorney General setting forth certain
information specified in the statute." 2 A foreign principal is defined

97. Id.1. 84a.
98. 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (2000).
99. Form 990 is in the process of being amended to require greater reporting on
charities' foreign activities, in order to assist terrorist financing enforcement
efforts. See Hearing,supra note 87, at 13.
100. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (2000).
101. 56 Stat. 248, 248-49 (1942); see also Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1986)
(reviewing the meaning of "political propaganda" under FARA); Viereck v. United
States, 318 U.S. 236, 244 (1943) (discussing congressional intent behind FARA).
102. 22 U.S.C. § 612(a) (noting that the registration statement includes
information such as the nationality of the individual, the nature of the registrant's
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as a government of a foreign country, a foreign political party, or an
individual affiliated or associated with either of them; a person
outside of the United States; an organization having its principal
place of business in a foreign country; or a domestic concern
subsidized by any one of the former. 10 3 FARA further defines the
term "agent of a foreign principal" to include any person who acts as
a publicity agent or public-relations counsel for a foreign principal;
any person who collects information, or reports information to a
foreign principal; and any person who engages in other similar
1°4
activities that are described in FARA in considerable detail.
Diplomatic and consular representatives, persons engaged in trade or
commerce, and press associations are expressly exempted from filing
a registration statement. 05 Non-exempt parties' failure to file a
registration statement, or filing a false one, is a felony, with a
maximum five-year sentence. 0 6 The criminal offenses within FARA
have been consistently upheld in the face of constitutional
challenges.

0 7

In 1966, FARA was amended to allow the Attorney General to
secure an injunction or restraining order whenever "any person is
engaged in or about to engage in any acts which constitute or will
business, and the nature and amount of contributions that the registrants received
from each foreign principal).
103. Id. § 611(b).
104. Id. § 611(c).
105. Id. § 613. This provision of FARA exempts eight classes of foreign agents
from the requirements of Section 612(a): 1) diplomatic or consular officials; 2)
officials of foreign governments; 3) staff members of diplomatic or consular
officers; 4) persons engaged in various private, nonpolitical activities; 5) persons
solely engaged in religious, scholastic, or scientific pursuits; 6) persons whose
activities concern the defense of a foreign government when such activities are
vital to U.S. security interests; 7) persons qualified to practice law on behalf of
identified foreign principals before U.S. courts and tribunals; and 8) agents of
foreign principles. Id.
106. Id. § 618(a). Some experts believe that FARA could be amended to provide
for a more onerous penalty in cases where the foreign principal is a terrorist
organization.
107. See Att'y Gen. of the United States v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 530 F. Supp.
241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Att'y Gen. of the United States v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 346
F. Supp. 1384, 1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd without opinion, 465 F.2d 1405 (2d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Frank, 23 F.R.D. 145, 146 (D.D.C. 1959); United
States v. Peace Info. Ctr., 97 F. Supp. 255, 262 (D.D.C. 1951).
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constitute a violation of any provision [of FARA]." 108 These civil
remedies were added because the pre-existing criminal sanctions
were thought too harsh for the sort of activities that were prescribed
by the statute.
Since 9/11, however, there are signs that FARA and its related
criminal statutes can become valuable tools in the national security
arsenal.109

CONCLUSION: SYNCHRONICITY
AND COMPETITION
It may seem odd to describe synchronicity as the product of a
constant and permanent internecine battle between various official
counterterrorism components. Intra-governmental warfare, after all,
does not conjure the image of smooth statecraft. I am not trying to
justify or encourage turf wars, with which the American public is
rightly disgusted. What I am suggesting is an ever-expanding
definition of turf, and a competition that is focused and regulated.
The American counterterrorism policy needs more entrepreneurial
spirit-an application of market forces-within the national security
community. We need a bigger playing field, and more players. This
includes a greater emphasis on domestic criminal tools, at a time
when their efficacy is sometimes overlooked in favor of other tools
that make for better news stories. This is particularly true of those
criminal tools designed to assure that the government has
information it needs to perform its lawful functions. If protecting
innocent people from political violence is one such function, we need
information about U.S. associations with international terrorist
organizations. Criminal prosecutions should focus on fraudulent
attempts to obtain government benefits-like citizenship and taxexempt status-while concealing these terrorist associations. These
investigations should be pursued because they promote the integrity

108. 22 U.S.C. § 618(f).
109. See United States v. Dumeisi, No. 03 CR 664-1, 2003 WL 22757747, at *12 (N.D. I11.Nov. 20, 2003) (prosecuting for the crime of acting as an unregistered
agent of a foreign government); see also Jeanine Ibrahim, Indiana Man Tried to
Sell Spy Names to Iraq, U.S. Alleges, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 4, 2005, at 5A
(discussing the arrest of Shaaban Hafiz Ahmad Ali Shaaban).
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of the benefits programs and regulatory regimes and could lead to
valuable intelligence. More importantly, they add to a menu of
options available to the country's counterterrorism officials.
My argument for more intra-govemment competition is not
unique. In his recent book-length critique of the 9/11 Commission
Report, Judge Richard A. Posner comes very close to what I am
suggesting, although his focus is on the ideal organization of the
intelligence community, rather than counterterrorism generally.11 °
Posner's main complaint with the 9/11 Commission
recommendations and the subsequent legislation involves the
tendency in reform efforts to equate centralization with coordination.
The two terms, Posner argues, are not synonymous. If an
organizational structure is too centralized, the result can be
impediments to the flow of information and a reduction in the
diversity of methods and cultures that promote a better end-product.
Where the product itself is intelligence, the process should promote,
rather than inhibit, competition, something that is sometimes lost in
movements towards centralization.
His argument is informed by his recognition of cognitive
limitations. The human mind will never be able to process all data
presented to its senses. If we have one person in charge of the
intelligence community, this person runs the risk of being inundated
with too many stimuli, particularly if he sits atop of a highly
centralized organization where diversity is not encouraged. This
person instead should promote an organizational architecture that
encourages a marketplace of ideas, which serve as a cauldron that
results in a better product for his consumption.
This phenomenon is even more pronounced when in comes to
counterterrorism operational decisions, which are based on
intelligence or, more precisely, "actionable intelligence." Operational
decisions-how and when to act, and against whom-are necessarily
made at the top. The person at the top, no matter how well he or she
is served by staff, can never be an expert in the various systems that
define whether a stream of intelligence qualifies as actionable,
thereby justifying an application of one of the many counterterrorism

110. RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS:
REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 (2005).
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tools. We do not ask federal prosecutors to determine whether there
is sufficient intelligence to justify a military strike, nor do we ask
military commanders to review the sufficiency of evidence for a
proposed criminal prosecution. Instead, the operational decisionmakers need to rely on those people who are experts in their
particular tools, and these experts should be encouraged to pursue
options, even if the process, to an outside observer, appears to be
parochial.
As Judge Posner puts it, when it comes to the business of
intelligence:
A diversity of preconceptions will generate a richer selection
of relevant information to analyze and a broader range of
perspectives among the analysts. We want analysts to be
sampling from the broadest possible range of data and to be
drawing inferences from their samples with different
mindsets .... [W]e want an intelligence culture in which the
regnant theories are constantly being challenged, not by
devil's advocates, who are merely stage challengers, but by
people who really see the world differently; and for those
people to have a voice and be heard-for a genuine clash of
theories to occur, as in science-requires a diverse
intelligence system, implying a flat structure with loose rather
than tight control over its component parts.III
The same is undoubtedly true if we are to make full and effective
use of a counterterrorism arsenal that is multi-faceted. Synchronicity
can only come from robust and constant competition.

111. Id. at 155.

